Integrity risks in professional borehole drilling: preventing corruption paves the way to sustainable infrastructure

This is a guest RWSN blog by Justine Haag and Marian Ryan of the Water Integrity Network. 

Integrity risks can be high in professional borehole drilling projects, particularly the risk of corruption, but too often such risks are brushed over or not even acknowledged. Some of these risks have been discussed in previous blog posts. This blog discusses in more detail some of the reasons underlying the importance of addressing corruption in professional borehole drilling.

Corruption contributes to poor delivery of groundwater development projects and is a factor of the failure of  15–30% of newly built wells within one year of construction (UNICEF/Skat 2016).

The good news is that by acknowledging and addressing integrity risks from the earliest project stages, WASH managers in both government and NGOs can take steps to prevent these risks and ensure sustainable infrastructure.

Let’s be real: corruption adds up

Across the world, a great deal of money goes into the drilling of boreholes, At the local level, while it might appear at first glance that the money lost to corruption on small borehole drilling projects in rural or remote locations is limited, even insignificant, the impacts are certainly not. Corruption results not only in wasted money, but, all too often, in sub-standard delivery of projects. This, in turn, results in downstream social, economic and environmental impacts.

From a purely financial perspective, corruption in groundwater development projects may result in inflated costs which undermine the financial sustainability of the project. Equally, corruption in decision-making processes may result in technical choices that ignore community needs, disregarding the local socio-cultural or economic context.

It may also mean that already-limited funds are not used where they are most needed. In many cases corruption means those with power and influence can pay to get improved services, while the most vulnerable are left behind.

When local users don’t see the promised results or services from their duty bearers, mistrust may grow. This can complicate other interventions in the water and sanitation sectors. Poor service delivery may also mean that communities resort to informal systems which may offer lesser guarantees in terms of quality and safety.

Corruption in borehole drilling projects also undermines health and security. Private operators who benefit from favoritism may not be subject to regulations and oversight, resulting in poor-functioning and ultimately decaying, unsustainable infrastructure and water systems.

Ultimately, corruption can threaten food, water, and energy security, greatly impacting the poorest residents.

All project phases are vulnerable to corruption

Corruption can take place at a number of points in the project lifecycle.

The tendering process is well known for posing a high risk of corruption: project owners may demand or receive bribes for awarding bids. They may exclude bids for spurious reasons in order to favour particular bidders. Bidders may organize as cartels, manipulate prices, or block smaller bidders through intimidation. A previous blog post examined how these practices serve to deter experienced professional consultants and drilling contractors from the bidding process, threatening the quality and sustainability of project infrastructure.

But corruption risks exist throughout the project life-cycle:

  • Regulatory environment: Corruption can weaken the rules of the tendering process, and weaken sanctions for misconduct. Corruption in licensing can also improperly restrict who can drill and where. Corruption can also result in biases in who water is allocated to.
  • Planning: Corruption at the planning level may result in services being provided to certain groups and not to others.
  • Financial management: Corruption here can take the shape of falsified accounts in local budgets, or funds which are embezzled or allocated to “ghost” drilling sites or the villages of family or friends.
  • Project design: Corruption in project design can take the form of design specifications being rigged to favor certain companies, such as those with higher-capacity rigs.
  • Construction: Corruption in the construction phase can result in poor-quality work and/or the use of poor quality materials, the bribing of officials to ignore it, and fraudulent invoicing and documentation.
  • Post-construction: the post-construction operation and maintenance phase is critical in the delivery of sustainable and effective services. Corruption in the operation and maintenance of groundwater systems can, for example, include nepotism in the appointment of staff, and the appointment of poorly qualified consultants and contractors. Lack of community input into the well’s operation can allow such corruption to flourish.

Promoting integrity benefits the community – and all stakeholders

It is possible to prevent these dangers from taking hold by building barriers to corruption throughout the project life cycle and by promoting integrity and planning ahead to close gaps where corruption can arise.

Promoting integrity from the start adds value by fostering transparency, accountability, and participation among the project’s stakeholders. Just as corruption has a wide impact, promoting integrity and anti-corruption can support each stakeholder’s efforts across the value chain. When we anticipate and avoid corruption risks, we reduce the likelihood of failure of wells and water points, decaying infrastructure, and disrupted water services.

Where can I start?

Project owners and WASH managers in government institutions or NGOs can take advantage of existing tools to promote integrity and prevent corruption to help ensure successful, professional borehole drilling projects which result in sustainable infrastructure and benefit local communities.

RWSN’s Code of Practice for Cost Effective Boreholes emphasizes the role of greater professionalism in ensuring that projects achieve optimum value for money invested over the long term. The UNICEF Guidance Note on Professional Water Well Drilling is a valuable resource for following professional standards in borehole drilling, including costing, procurement and contracting, siting of wells, and supervision of water well drilling.

Key first steps:

  • Establish procedures for key risk areas like procurement and accounting, and make sure procedures are followed by providing training and support to all stakeholders (such as authorities, bidders, regulators, project monitors, utility accounting staff).
  • Clarify budgets and responsibilities, and ensure this information is easily available to the public.
  • Set up monitoring processes, for tendering, construction, and O&M. Social monitoring, including local users or stakeholders, can be particularly helpful and ensure more independence in the process.
  • Ensure institutional responsibility for long-term operations or properly functioning infrastructure over the entire lifecycle.
  • Consult water users and water-user associations in decision-making.


More tools:

Integrity pact : The Integrity Pacts help to ensure that contracting parties in a water project abstain from offering, accepting, or demanding bribes; monitor adherence to the contract and compliance with procurement legislation; and enable the placement of sanctions on any parties breaching the pact.

Integrity, Quality, and Compliance for Project Managers : This set of simple project management tools and templates helps improve project management and address common integrity issues from planning through operations, specifically in water-related programmes.

About the authors

Justine Haag coordinates WIN’s West Africa Programme and is in charge of the Capacity Development portfolio, ensuring the mainstreaming of water integrity tools and methodologies in the water sector at global, national, and local levels. She has over 10 years of international experience with water practitioners, working mainly on WASH and IWRM initiatives carried out with multilateral and bilateral aid organizations. She is keen to support participatory processes with a broad range of actors, following her conviction that institutional stakeholders and end users have common values and can reach consensus.

Marian Ryan is a freelance writer and editor specialized in health, international development, and water integrity. She collaborates regularly with the Water Integrity Network to write about and promote integrity Tools.

Photo credit: Joost Butenop, WIN photo competition 2009. Uncontrolled diversion of water from surrounding villages, Western Pakistan.Joost_Butenop

Attracting the best: Why some experienced consultants and drilling contractors are no longer willing to work for district local government

This is the third in a series of four blogs entitled Professional Borehole Drilling: Learning from Uganda written by Elisabeth Liddle, and a RWSN webinar in 2019 about professional borehole drilling. It draws on research in Uganda by Liddle and Fenner (2018). We welcome your thoughts in reply to this blog below.

Several recent reports have raised concerns over the quality of the boreholes that are being sited and constructed in rural sub-Saharan Africa (UNICEF/Skat, 2016, Bonsor et al., 2015; Anscombe, 2011; Sloots, 2010). If high-quality boreholes are to be sited and constructed, skilled experienced personnel are needed to conduct this work. Recent research in Uganda, highlights that a number of the most experienced consultants and drilling contractors in Uganda (those who have been in business for fifteen – twenty years) are no longer willing to bid for district local government contracts (Liddle and Fenner, 2018). This is concerning, given that district local government projects accounted for 68% of new deep boreholes drilled in the financial year 2016/17 (MWE, 2017).

In this blog I outline why these consultants and drilling contractors are no longer willing to work for districts.

1. Low prices


A number of the consultants and drilling contractors interviewed are simply dissatisfied with the prices that district local governments are willing to pay compared to that of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The consultants interviewed, for example, stated that districts are typically willing to pay UGX 1 million – UGX 2 million (US $276 – $552[1]) for siting and supervision, while NGOs are typically willing to pay UGX 2.5 million – UGX 3.5 million (US $691 – $967) for the same work. The price districts are willing to pay is reportedly not realistic, and as a result, these consultants would have to take shortcuts in their work. The same issues were reported among the drillers who are no longer willing to work for the district local governments. These consultants and drillers are not willing to undertake sub-standard water points for communities, take shortcuts in their work, nor tarnish the reputation of their companies.

2. Misuse of ‘lump sum, no-water-no-pay’ payment terms


As explained in blog “Turnkey contracts for borehole siting and drilling”, drilling under a turnkey contract was found to be common during this research: 26 of the implementing agencies interviewed in Uganda (n = 29), for example, were procuring the private sector for the implementation work, 19 of whom were using turnkey contracts for the siting and drilling work and paying the driller via lump sum, no-water-no-pay payment terms. Typically, under these combined ‘lump sum, no-water-no-pay’ payment terms, if a borehole is unsuccessful (is dry or low-yielding), the driller is not paid. If the borehole is successful, the driller should be paid the full lump sum price, regardless of the costs incurred on-site. A number of districts, however, are deviating from lump sum, no-water-no-pay payment term norms. Instead of paying the full lump sum as they should do, they are only paying for the actual work done and materials used (known as BoQ payment or admeasurement payment in Uganda). While this may be specified in the driller’s contract, it is concerning given that the whole premise behind lump sum no-water-no-pay payment terms is that, while drillers will lose money on unsuccessful boreholes, they will be able to recover these costs from the full lump sums they are paid for the successful boreholes. Without full lump sum payment, drillers are unable to their losses..

3. Bribes during the bidding process


Demands for bribes are reportedly common when bidding for district local government contracts. When a bribe is demanded, consultants and drillers struggle to account for this cost: if they account for this in their quote, their quote will be too high, thus, they will not win the contract. If, however, they do not account for the price of the bribe in their quote, the consultant or driller will then need to recover this cost at some stage, usually through taking shortcuts on-site. If consultants and drillers do not want to take shortcuts in their work they will not bid.

4. Late payment


Receiving the full payment from districts for completed works can be challenging, with several drilling contractors reporting that in some cases, they had to wait over a year to receive their full payment. This makes business difficult; it is much easier to only work for NGOs who are known for paying on time.

The following quotes help to exemplify the above issues:

“But I tell you, for the last few years I have not bided for a district job because the bidding process is just so silly. You know, they will already know who is going to win the contract before they even advertise…And the terms and conditions in the contract are very unfavourable to the driller… So I have not drilled for the district for the last five years as there is no guarantee that they will pay us, this is not a viable business model for us…They only pay on time 50% of the time. Even when the borehole is successful, they will say, oh we don’t have any money, we’ll have to pay in next quarter. Sometimes this has gone on for a whole year. It was with a district that it took 14 months for me to be paid once… The guarantee of receiving payment is frustrating” (Drilling Contractor).

“I strongly believe bidding is just a procedure for most projects. In most cases the districts are giving contracts after they [the bidder] has paid them for the contract. So, say it is a contract for 100 million, they will want 20 million during bidding. This problem is with district, not NGOs, not the ministry… So I have stopped drilling for districts, it was too expensive” (Drilling Contractor).

“I don’t like working for the district. To be honest they are simply corrupt. It is very hard to get a contract from them, you’ve often got to bribe to simply get the contract. They’ll always ask for extra money. It is disturbing. If you don’t agree to pay them, they will find a way of explaining why you did not get the contract” (Consultant).

Districts are now beginning to notice this issue as well, as explained by one district water officer below:

“So many of them [drillers] are so business orientated that even during the time of bidding they under quote so they can win the contract…now because of that they have made serious drillers pull out of district work as they cannot win government contracts. Most of the serious drillers are now dealing with NGOs because they know the procurement process is much more transparent and they will be able to get the money that they need to do a good job. But for local government, they cannot. So we have lost some really good drillers because of this, because they cannot compete and most times most local government want to select the lowest bidder… So we have a big challenge here because we don’t want government to lose money by selecting the more expensive driller but this means the really high quality ones have left district work” (District Water Office).

These quotes highlight the long-term consequences for district local governments who are known for engaging in practices such as paying low prices, offering unfavourable payment terms, soliciting bribes, and making late payments. Finding solutions to these problems is essential to ensure that experienced consultants and drilling contractors are willing to support district work going forward.

What do you think?

So what do you think? Do you have experiences of unrealistically low prices (or the opposite), unfavourable payment terms, bribery in the procurement process or late payments. Or can you share any particularly promising practices with us? You can respond below by posting in the reply below, or you can join the live webinar on the 14th of May (register here).


Anscombe, J.R. (2011). Quality assurance of UNICEF drilling programmes for boreholes in Malawi. Lilongwe, Malawi: Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Water Development, Government of Malawi, Available from

Bonsor, H.C., Oates, N., Chilton, P.J., Carter, R.C., Casey, V., MacDonald, A.M., Etti, B., Nekesa, J., Musinguzi, F., Okubal, P., Alupo, G., Calow, R., Wilson, P., Tumuntungire, M., and Bennie, M. (2015). A Hidden Crisis: Strengthening the evidence base on the current failure of rural groundwater supplies, 38th WEDC International Conference, Loughborough University, UK, 2014, Available from

Liddle, E.S. and Fenner, R.A. (2018). Review of handpump-borehole implementation in Uganda. Nottingham, UK: BGS (OR/18/002).

MWE (2017) Sector Performance Report 2017, Ministry of Water and Environment, Government of Uganda, Available from

Sloots, R. (2010). Assessment of groundwater investigations and borehole drilling capacity in Uganda. Kampala, Uganda: Ministry of Water and Environment, Government of Uganda, and UNICEF, Available from

UNICEF/Skat (2016). Professional water well drilling: A UNICEF guidance note. St Gallen, Switzerland: Skat and UNICEF, Available from

[1] May 2017 exchange rate.


photo #1: “Bidding process poster on display in a District Procurement Office” (Source: Elisabeth Liddle).


This work is part of the Hidden Crisis project within the UPGro research programme – co-funded by NERC, DFID, and ESRC.

The fieldwork undertaken for this report is part of the authors PhD research at the University of Cambridge, under the supervision of Professor Richard Fenner. This fieldwork was funded by the Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund and UPGro: Hidden Crisis.

Thank you to those of you from Makerere University and WaterAid Uganda who provided logistical and field support while I was conducting the interviews for this report (especially Dr Michael Owor, Felece Katusiime, and Joseph Okullo from Makerere University and Gloria Berochan from WaterAid Uganda). Thank you also to all of the respondents for being eager and willing to participate in this research.

Comment attirer les meilleurs, ou pourquoi certains consultants et entrepreneurs de forage expérimentés ne sont plus disposés à travailler pour le gouvernement local du district

Il s’agit du troisième d’une série de quatre blogs intitulée ‘Le forage professionnel de puits d’eau: Apprendre de l’Ouganda” de Elisabeth Liddle et d’un webinaire en 2019 sur le forage de puits professionnel. Cette série s’appuie sur les recherches menées en Ouganda par Liddle et Fenner (2018). Nous vous invitons à nous faire part de vos commentaires en réponse à ce blog ci-dessous.

Plusieurs rapports récents ont remis en question la qualité des forages en cours de construction en Afrique subsaharienne rurale (UNICEF/Skat, 2016, Bonsor et al., 2015; Anscombe, 2011; Sloots, 2010). Pour implanter et construire des forages de haute qualité être, un personnel qualifié et expérimenté doit être en mesure d’effectuer ces travaux. Des recherches récentes en Ouganda montrent qu’un certain nombre de consultants et d’entrepreneurs en forage parmi les plus expérimentés en Ouganda (ceux qui sont en activité depuis quinze à vingt ans) ne sont plus disposés à être engagés pour des contrats de collectivités locales de district (Liddle and Fenner, 2018). Ceci est préoccupant, étant donné que les projets des collectivités locales de district représentent 68% des nouveaux forages profonds forés au cours de l’année fiscale 2016/17 (MWE, 2017).

Dans ce blog, j’explique pourquoi ces consultants et entrepreneurs en forage ne sont plus disposés à travailler pour les districts.

1. Les prix sont trop bas

Un certain nombre de consultants et d’entrepreneurs de forage interrogés ne sont tout simplement pas satisfaits des prix que les collectivités locales de district sont prêtes à payer par rapport aux organisations non gouvernementales (ONG). Les consultants interrogés, par exemple, ont déclaré que les districts sont généralement disposés à payer de 1 à 2 million d’UGX (276 $US – 552 $US [1]) pour l’implantation et la supervision, tandis que les ONG sont généralement disposées à payer de 2,5 à 3,5 millions d’UGX (691 $US – 967 $US) pour le même travail. Le prix que les districts sont prêts à payer n’est apparemment pas réaliste et, en conséquent, ces consultants ne seraient pas en mesure de réaliser un travail de qualité. Les mêmes problèmes ont été signalés chez les foreurs qui ne sont plus disposés à travailler pour les autorités locales du district. Ces consultants et foreurs ne sont pas prêts à réaliser des points d’eau inférieurs aux normes pour les communautés du fait de ces bas prix, à prendre des raccourcis dans leur travail, ou à ternir la réputation de leurs entreprises.

2. Usage abusif des modalités de paiement forfaitaire “pas d’eau, pas de paiement”

Comme l’explique le blog “Contrats clés en main pour l’implantation et le forage de puits d’eau“, l’utilisation de contrats clés en main est fréquente en Ouganda: sur les 29 organisations interviewées au cours de cette recherche, 26 organisations travaillaient avec le secteur privé dans le cadre de contrat de forages, et 19 rémunéraient les foreurs pour l’implantation et le forage à travers des paiements forfaitaires “pas d’eau, pas de paiement”. Il est typique selon ces modalités de paiement que le foreur ne soit pas payé, si un forage échoue (si il est à sec ou à faible rendement). Si le forage est réussi, le foreur doit recevoir le prix forfaitaire total, quels que soient les coûts engagés sur place. Un certain nombre de districts, cependant, s’écartent des normes de paiement forfaitaire “pas d’eau, pas de paiement”. Au lieu de payer la totalité de la somme forfaitaire comme ils devraient le faire, ils ne paient que pour le travail réellement effectué et les matériaux utilisés (connu sous le nom de paiement au devis (BoQ) ou paiement ‘admeasurement’ en Ouganda). Bien que cela puisse être spécifié dans le contrat de forage, cela reste inquiétant, étant donné la prémisse sur laquelle les modalités de paiement forfaitaire “pas d’eau, pas de paiement” est basée: même si les foreurs perdent de l’argent sur les forages infructueux, ils devraient être en mesure de récupérer ces coûts à travers les sommes forfaitaires qui leur sont versées pour les forages réussis. Sans un paiement forfaitaire intégral, les foreurs sont incapables de recouvrir leurs pertes.

3. Les pots-de-vin pendant le processus d’appel d’offres

Les demandes de pots-de-vin seraient fréquentes lors des appels d’offres pour des contrats de collectivités locales de district. Lorsqu’un pot-de-vin est exigé, les consultants et les foreurs ont du mal à rendre compte de ce coût : s’ils en tiennent compte dans leur devis, leur devis sera trop élevé et ils ne gagneront donc pas le contrat. Si, toutefois, ils ne tiennent pas compte du prix du pot-de-vin dans leur devis, le consultant ou le foreur devra alors récupérer ce coût à un moment donné, généralement en effectuant un travail de mauvaise qualité sur place. Si les consultants et les foreurs ne veulent pas travailler dans ces conditions, ils ne soumissionneront pas.

4. Les retards de paiement

Recevoir un paiement intégral de la part des districts pour les travaux achevés peut être difficile: plusieurs entrepreneurs de forage signalent que dans certains cas, ils ont dû attendre plus d’un an pour recevoir leur paiement intégral. Cela rend les affaires difficiles. Il est beaucoup plus facile de ne travailler que pour des ONG qui ont la réputation de payer à temps.

Les citations suivantes aident à illustrer les problèmes ci-dessus:

«Mais je vous le dis, ces dernières années, je n’ai pas soumissionné pour un contrat avec le district, car le processus de candidature est tellement ridicule. Vous savez, ils savent déjà qui va remporter le contrat avant même de l’annoncer … Et les termes et conditions du contrat sont très défavorables au foreur … Je n’ai donc pas foré pour le district depuis cinq ans, rien ne garantit qu’ils nous paieront, ce n’est pas un modèle commercial viable pour nous… Ils paient seulement à temps dans 50% des cas. Même si le forage a réussi, ils diront: Nous n’avons pas d’argent, nous devrons payer le prochain trimestre. Parfois, cela dure depuis un an. Avec un district, il a fallu 14 mois pour que je sois payé une fois… La garantie de recevoir un paiement est frustrante» (Entrepreneur de forage).

«Je crois fermement que la passation de marché est seulement une procédure pour la plupart des projets. Dans la plupart des cas, les districts signent des contrats après que le soumissionnaire leur ait donné de l’argent pour celui-ci. Alors, disons que c’est un contrat de 100 millions, ils voudront 20 millions lors du processus d’appel d’offres. Ce problème concerne les districts, pas les ONG, ni le ministère … J’ai donc arrêté de forer pour les districts, c’était trop cher» (Entrepreneur de forage)

«Je n’aime pas travailler pour le district. Pour être honnête, ils sont tout simplement corrompus. Il est très difficile d’obtenir un contrat de leur part, vous devez souvent payer pour obtenir le contrat. Ils demanderont toujours de l’argent en plus. C’est dérangeant. Si vous n’acceptez pas de les payer, ils trouveront un moyen d’expliquer pourquoi vous n’avez pas obtenu le contrat » (Consultant)

Les districts commencent maintenant à remarquer ce problème également, comme l’explique l’un des responsables de l’eau du district ci-dessous:

«Un si grand nombre d’entre eux [les foreurs] ont une mentalité tellement axée sur le “business” que pendant la période de la passation de marché, ils montent une offre qui défie toute concurrence avec des prix trop bas afin de pouvoir remporter le contrat. La plupart des foreurs sérieux travaillent maintenant seulement avec les ONG car ils savent que le processus de passation de marché est beaucoup plus transparent et qu’ils pourront obtenir l’argent dont ils ont besoin pour faire du bon travail. Mais avec le gouvernement local, ils ne peuvent pas. Nous avons donc perdu de très bons foreurs à cause de cela, parce qu’ils ne peuvent pas défier cette concurrence, et que la plupart des gouvernements locaux veulent choisir le soumissionnaire aux prix les plus bas… Nous avons donc un gros défi à relever car nous ne voulons pas que le gouvernement perde de l’argent en sélectionnant les foreurs les plus chers mais cela signifie que les foreurs qui font du travail de très haute qualité ne travaillent plus avec le district » (Responsable de l’eau pour le district)

Ces citations mettent en évidence les conséquences à long terme pour les administrations locales de district connues pour des pratiques telles que payer des prix trop bas, proposer des conditions de paiement défavorables, solliciter des pots-de-vin et effectuer des paiements en retard. Il est essentiel de trouver des solutions à ces problèmes pour que des consultants expérimentés et des entrepreneurs en forage soient prêts à soutenir les travaux des districts.

Qu’en pensez-vous?

Alors, qu’en pensez-vous? Avez-vous des expériences de prix bas irréalistes (ou l’inverse), de conditions de paiement défavorables, de corruption dans le processus de passation de marché ou de retards de paiement? Ou pouvez-vous partager des pratiques particulièrement prometteuses avec nous? Vous pouvez répondre ci-dessous en postant un commentaire, ou vous pouvez participer au webinaire en direct le 14 mai (inscriptions ici)


Anscombe, J.R. (2011). Quality assurance of UNICEF drilling programmes for boreholes in Malawi. Lilongwe, Malawi: Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Water Development, Government of Malawi, Available from

Bonsor, H.C., Oates, N., Chilton, P.J., Carter, R.C., Casey, V., MacDonald, A.M., Etti, B., Nekesa, J., Musinguzi, F., Okubal, P., Alupo, G., Calow, R., Wilson, P., Tumuntungire, M., and Bennie, M. (2015). A Hidden Crisis: Strengthening the evidence base on the current failure of rural groundwater supplies, 38th WEDC International Conference, Loughborough University, UK, 2014, Available from

Liddle, E.S. and Fenner, R.A. (2018). Review of handpump-borehole implementation in Uganda. Nottingham, UK: BGS (OR/18/002).

MWE (2017) Sector Performance Report 2017, Ministry of Water and Environment, Government of Uganda, Available from

Sloots, R. (2010). Assessment of groundwater investigations and borehole drilling capacity in Uganda. Kampala, Uganda: Ministry of Water and Environment, Government of Uganda, and UNICEF, Available from

UNICEF/Skat (2016). Professional water well drilling: A UNICEF guidance note. St Gallen, Switzerland: Skat and UNICEF, Available from

[1] taux de change de Mai 2017


Ce travail fait partie du projet Hidden Crisis du programme de recherche UPGro – cofinancé par le NERC, le DFID et l’ESRC.

Le travail de terrain entrepris pour ce rapport fait partie de la recherche doctorale des auteurs à l’Université de Cambridge, sous la supervision du Professeur Richard Fenner. Ce travail sur le terrain a été financé par le Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund et UPGro : Hidden Crisis.

Merci à ceux d’entre vous de l’Université de Makerere et de WaterAid Ouganda qui m’ont apporté un soutien logistique, y compris sur le terrain, pendant que je menais les entretiens pour ce rapport (en particulier le Dr Michael Owor, Felece Katusiime et Joseph Okullo de l’Université Makerere et Gloria Berochan de WaterAid Uganda). Merci également à tous les répondants d’avoir été enthousiastes et disposés à participer à cette recherche.


photo: ” Affiche d’évaluation des offres et d’attribution du contrat exposée dans un bureau de passation de marché de district ” (Source: Elisabeth Liddle)